

THE BOMBAY COURIER.

[PUBLISHED TWICE A-WEEK, — EVERY SATURDAY AND TUESDAY MORNING. — PRICE 13 RUPEES PER QUARTER].

VOL. XLII.]

TUESDAY, 22 JULY, 1834.

[NO. 2355.]

SEALED Tenders (post paid) will be received by the Paymaster of the 4th Light Dragoons, until the 3th Proximo, for a Bill or Bills upon Messrs. HOPKINSON, BARTON and KNYVETT, Regent Street, London. Amount £190, or thereabouts, at 20 days after sight. The Bidding to be in Poona Rupees, and for sums not less than £50.
Kirkee, 11th July, 1834.

SALE by Auction on Thursday next, the 24th July. YATES, and Co. will sell by public Auction, an extensive Invoice of stores lately imported, comprising 100 fine York Hams, Stilton, Pine, Cheshire, Cheddar, and Berkeley Cheese, Raspberry Jam, Red Currant do. Black do. Jellies in great variety, 50 cases of prime Pickles, Walnut and Mushroom Kestup, Reading, John Bull, and Anchovy, Sauce, French Olives, Durham Mustard in 1, 2 and 1lb. bottles, 50 Jars Red herrings, Macaroni and Vermicelli, Bottled fruits, Cotton, and Silk Umbrellas, 200 Native Turbans, and a variety of other goods.

A Grey Horse, a Chesnut Poney, and any other Cattle or Carriages that may offer.
YATES AND CO., have received for sale several dogs, a number of Canaries, Normandy Pippins, and a large collection of children's toys, Pink and White Champaign, &c. &c.
Meadow Street, 22d July, 1834.

ADVERTISEMENT.
NOTICE is hereby given, that MERYAM-JEE BEBEE, of Bombay, Mahomedan woman, and THOMAS WHITE, a Native Doctor of Bombay, British Inhabitant, have contracted to mortgage a House with its ground, situated without the Town walls of Bombay in new Town, on the Duncan road, and assessed by the collector of assessment under number 154, to HORMUSJEE BOMANJEE, sett, of Bombay Parsee, inhabitant, that any person or persons having any claim or demand by way of mortgage, inheritable rights, or otherwise, upon the aforesaid house, he, she, or they, are hereby required to make known in writing thro' an Attorney at Law, to the said mortgagee, Hormusjee Bomanjee, sett, in Gunbow street, within the Town walls of Bombay, within 14 days from the date hereof, otherwise he, she, or they, will be excluded the benefit of their claim, and after the expiration of the said space, the Money shall be paid to the mortgagee.—Dated 21st July, 1834.

જાહેર. ખબર
ખબર. રીઆથી. આપીએચે
મુશલમનીન. મરીઅમજી. બીબી. તથા.
દામશ. વાહદ. ગાંમડી. વહડ. શ્રી. મુમજીનો
મંજાર. રહેવાશીનુ. યેહર. એફ. જમીન. મુદા
શ્રી. બાહુરફત. દનફત. રોડ. આગલ. ખેતવા
ડીમેકે. તે. કુપર. આશીશ મિનરતી. બુકનો. નં
ખર ૧૫૪ મેકે. તે. હોરમજી. બમનજી. શેઠ.
શ્રી. મુમજીનો. પારશી. રહેવાશીન. ગીરવી.
આપવાનુ. શાહુ. શ્રીકું. એ. કુપર. હરમેફ.
લોક. અચવા. લોકીનો. ગીરવી. અચવા. વારશી
અચવા. બીજી. ફાંજ. રીતનો. દાવો. અચવા.
મંગાલ. પોચનુ. હોમેતો. તેનાં. ખેત. બા. ફરે
ચે. આજથી. દીન ૧૪ ની. મુદતમો. ગીરવી.
લેનાર. હોરમજી. બમનજી. શેઠ. શ્રી. ફોરમો
ધનબાવાનાં. મોહોલામાં. હરમેફ. ધારાનાં. વ
શ્રીલનીનો. દીશની. મારફતે. આજથી. દીન ૧૪
ની. મુદતમો. બહર. ફરે. મુદત. પહી. ફોજનો
દાવો. ફણુલ. ફરશે. નહી. મુદત. કુપર. ત. એ
રૂપીઆ. ગીરવી. આપનારાં. ખેત. આપેઆમો
આવશે. તારીખ ૨૧ મી. જુલાઈ ૧૮૩૪.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO CALCUTTA.
THE fine Teak ship "PALMIRA", of 600 Tons Register, Wm. LOADER, Commander. This ship sails fast, has a poop and very excellent accommodations for passengers, and carries a Surgeon. Apply to the Commander at the Office of MCGREGOR EDMOND AND CO.
Bombay, 22d July, 1834.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO LONDON.
THE British built Barque "JOHN STAMP", of 400 Tons Register, JOHN YOUNG, Commander, has room for about 350 tons of Freight, and will have quick despatch. Apply to the commander at the office of MCGREGOR, EDMOND CO.
Bombay, 21st July, 1834.

FOR PASSAGE TO LONDON.
THE Ship "WILLIAM," has good accommodation for two or three Passengers, and will be dispatched about 27th instant. Apply to Captain CLARK, on board, or to FERGUSON, TURNER and Co.

PASSAGE TO LIVERPOOL.
THE Ship JOHN TAYLOR, will have immediate dispatch. Apply to Captain CRAWFORD, at the office of Messrs. DIRM, CARTER and Co.
Bombay, 21st July, 1834.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO LONDON, CALLING AT THE CAPE.
THE fine Ship EARL OF ELDON, of 600 Tons, EDWARD THEAKER, commander, will sail about the 15th August.
This Ship has a Poop with elegant accommodation for Passengers, and carries a Surgeon.
Apply to Captain THEAKER, or to Messrs. RITCHIE, STEUART AND CO.
Bombay, 22d July, 1834.

FOR FREIGHT OR PASSAGE TO LIVERPOOL.
THE fine Ship RANGER, of 520 Tons, THOMAS SMITH, commander. This Ship has a Poop with excellent accommodation for Passengers, and will be dispatched about 15th August.
Apply to Captain SMITH on board, or to Messrs. RITCHIE, STEUART AND CO.
Bombay, 22d July, 1834.

ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES.
Asst. Surg. J. G. Hulton, I. Navy, from the Red Sea.
Capt. P. C. Freeman, 2nd Gr. Regt. to Sholapoor.
DOMESTIC OCCURRENCES.
DEATHS.

On Saturday last, July 19th, at Belair, Bombay, of Dysentery, after a few days illness, Sarah Maria, wife of Sir J. W. Awdry, aged 34.
June 12th, on board His Majesty's Ship Magicienne, at sea, Mr. Edward Duncan Greensword, aged 37, Master of that ship; much respected and esteemed by all who knew him.

On the 9th instant, at Kunhur, of a Paralytic stroke, Lieut. Peter Sellwood Hewitt, aged 44, of H. H. the 7th Regiment Nizam's Regular Infantry, leaving six orphan children to mourn his irreparable loss.

SHIPPING REPORT.
ARRIVALS.
July 19th.—Ship John Stamp, John Young, Master from Rio de Janeiro 22nd May.
—20th.—His Majesty's Ship Magicienne, J. H. Plumridge, Esq., Capt., from Zanzibar, 8th July, 1834.
Passengers.—Ensign Todd, H. M. 40th Regt.
—Do.—The Hon'ble Company's Surveying Brig Palinurus, Lieut. S. B. Haines, Commander, from Socotra, 13th July.

DEPARTURES.
—18th.—Ship Prince George, Francis Shaw, Master, to Calcutta.
Passengers.—Mrs. Shaw, Master George Shaw, Infant, Thomas S. Thomson, Catholic Bishop Jenny Pedro Ayer, and 3 Servants.
—19th.—Ship Oriental, G. Fidler, Master, to Liverpool.

Passengers.—Mrs. Kemball, and child, Mrs. Jackson, and 2 children, Lieut. Col. H. G. White, Artillery, Capt. Jackson, J. E. Howard, Esq., Solicitor, Mr. F. Stanley, Mariner, 2 Miss Andersons and 3 Servants.
—20th.—Ship Duke of Roxburgh, James Petrie, Master, to Calcutta.
—Do.—Ship Kirkman Finlay, Alex. Russell, Master, to China.
Passengers.—J. Gladston, Esq., and J. Alexander, Esq.

A LIST OF SHIPPING IN THE HARBOUR.
HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP, Magicienne.
HON'BLE COMPANY'S STEAMER, Hugh Lindsay.
DO. GUARD-SHIP, Hastings.
DO. SLOOP OF WAR, Benares and Amherst.
DO. BRIG OF WAR, Euphrates.
DO. SCHOONERS, Shannon and Royal Tiger.
DO. FLOATING CHAPEL, Aurora.
DO. SURVEYING BRIG, Palinurus.
FREE TRADERS, Cleveland, Carnatic, Earl of Eldon, Triumph, Palmira, Morgiana, Isabella, Calcutta, Ranger, Upton Castle Minerva, Charles Grant, William, Anna Robertson, Mermaid, John Taylor, and John Stamp.

COUNTRY VESSELS.—Shaw Byramore, Prime, Mackbar, Dadaloy Hannah, Cavendish Bentinck, Sulimany, Carron, Clairmont, and Sultana.
PORTUGUESE.—St. Anna, St. Francisco de Paulo, and Barque Asia Felix.
ARAB.—Fazel Kurim, Pattay Nesser, and the Imaum's Brig Tawze.
FRENCH SHIP.—Le Oriental.

THE COURIER.

TUESDAY, 22 JULY, 1834.

His Majesty's Ship *Magicienne*, Capt. J. H. Plumridge, arrived on Sunday from Zanzibar, having remained 15 days at that Port, making the passage of 2560 Miles in 12 days, at the average rate of 214 miles a day, and traversed 6725 miles in 35 days. The Imaum of Muscat was at Zanzibar when the *Magicienne* left, and had no immediate intention to return to Muscat. His Highness's vessels, the Liverpool 74 guns, Shaw Allam 50, Mintise 32, Romanie 24, and Sultana 12, remained at Zanzibar, with 1 Portuguese ship, and 1 American Brig, The Imaum, and the two Princes, his sons, visited the *Magicienne*, were received with all the Honors due to Royalty; remained on board two hours, and appeared highly delighted with the reception given them. The Imaum's attentions to the officers and crew of the *Magicienne* were such as might have been expected from so generous a Prince, and so faithful an Ally.

It is currently reported, and we believe on good authority, that a reply has been received to the reference made some time ago by this Government to the Governor General, in obedience to instructions from the Court of Directors, on the subject of the Indian Navy; and that His Lordship has expressed an opinion adverse to the maintenance of a Force of that description for the performance of the duties on which it has hitherto been employed. It is said that Lord Bentinck conceives an arrangement could be effected for the execution of those duties by His Majesty's squadron in the Indian Seas, the expense of which would be much less than the cost of the Indian Navy. On what calculations this opinion is founded, we have not heard; but unless we suppose they have been made on the assumption that a smaller number of ships than are now employed, will suffice for the duty, it is not easy to understand how the estimate could exhibit a result warranting such a conclusion, as it is well known that the system of manning the Indian Navy with mixed crews of Europeans and natives; whatever may be the objections to which it is liable on other grounds—possesses a great advantage on the score of economy. It is possible, indeed, that His Lordship considering there is not sufficient work for the squadron, contemplates the employment of a portion of it on the duties now executed by the Indian Navy; but in this case, would not the expense of the vessels so employed be chargeable to the Indian Government; and if so, where the saving? If the first supposition be correct, little reliance, we apprehend, can be placed on the calculations of the comparative cost of the existing arrangement, and that by which it is proposed to supersede it; for, though every endeavour has been directed to that effect, this Government has, we believe, found it impracticable to effect any considerable reduction in the number of vessels composing the Indian Navy; and it seems extremely doubtful whether the Supreme Government will be able to carry into effect, without prejudice to the public service, a greater reduction than this Government, with all its advantages of local superintendence, has been able to accomplish. It is satisfactory, however, to know that the Governor General's despatch does not call upon this Government to act upon His Lordship's views, which are communicated for the purpose of being submitted, with the opinion of the Governor in Council of this Presidency, to the Court of Directors, with whom it rests to pass a decision on the question. There seems no probability, therefore, of the present arrangement being disturbed for some time to come. But should the Indian Navy be abolished, we have no doubt that the claims of the officers and men will receive every consideration. Indeed, it is asserted that, in anticipation of such a contingency, Lord Clare has suggested a scheme, which has met the entire approbation of the Governor General, embracing a provision for every individual in the service, on the most liberal principles.

A correspondent and subscriber has just received a letter from a friend at Grand Cairo, who left this for the Red Sea in the Steamer, which contains the following intelligence, most interesting to those who are fond of Natural History, and which he has kindly placed at our disposal:—

"On my arrival at Mocha, the disturbed state of the Coast prevented my proceeding direct to Egypt, and I was induced to cross over to the other side of the Red Sea, and join the Surveying ship Benares at Massowa, the Sea port of Abyssinia. Here I remained a fortnight, and enjoyed myself extremely. The climate is delightful, and game more abundant than I have ever seen in any place. All the animals too are new and curious, and were not known to Naturalists till the present time, when a Mr. Rüppell, a German, who has been in Abyssinia for some years past, collected the whole, and carried his specimens to Europe about six months ago. There is a curious kind of partridge, different from any other species known, which is in great abundance; a large bird weighs about 1½ lbs; Guinea fowl run about wild in troops of 50 and 60 together. The hares are very small, with enormous ears, and very abundant; a small antelope, about the size of a large English hare, but higher on its legs, the male with small horns, is found in pairs, and shot like hares out of the bushes; very beautiful little animals. There are besides, five or six other kinds of antelope, all of which I did not see.—One, the Beza, a magnificent brute, about the size of the Neelgae, and much the same build, has long slender horns recurved, about 5 feet long; his color pale dun, with black stripes, one down his face, one through each cheek, another down his throat to the chest, where it divides and runs along each flank, and a black list down the back. It was shot by a native. The Agazin is as large, with spiral twisted horns, but I did not see it. Then there is our Guzerat Gazelle, another species resembling it, but larger with more curved horns, and white buttocks up to the root of the tail—perhaps the Cape spring buck. I saw, but could not get, another kind called Susha. There were a few, but only a few, of the common grey quail. I was so much delighted that I would recommend any one coming on sick leave to Egypt, under the late orders of Government, to touch at Massowa for the sake of a month's sport. But the people are dire savages, sulky, obstinate, lazy, disobliging. I could not get beaters for love or money. An order from Mohamad Ali to the Turkish Governor there would be necessary, and would facilitate one's views. A man with his rifle, however, could always procure sport.

There are good mules to be hired, and as the country is entirely pastoral, you can get plenty of fine milk and butter in the interior, and cheap. When you go to Bombay ask Captain C. to shew you the head of a wild Boar brought from Massowa, a different species. They are double the size of their Indian brethren, with tusks more fitted for Elephant's jaws than those of Pigs, and would try the mettle of some of your Guzerat friends. The language is Arabic, and African, a native dialect, but Arabic carries you every where."

MADRAS

Will it be believed that, in these days, an antiquated order should be raked up from its obscurity, which actually forbids the perusal of Newspapers by private soldiers! Yet such has been done, and we subjoin a letter written to the Bengal *Hurkaru* as a perfect curiosity. It cannot be but the present Commander in Chief in India will immediately rescind so absurd an order.

—, June 12, 1833,
TO THE PROPRIETORS OF THE BENGAL HURKARU.
DEAR GENTLEMEN.—It has been intimated to Major — in temporary Command of the Regiment, that it is "contrary to the Regulation or Orders of the Commander in Chief, for Soldiers to have the perusal of public newspapers;" pending a reference on the subject, I am directed to beg you will discontinue sending the *Bengal Hurkaru*, on account of the Soldiers' Library, of the — Infantry. I have written to Lieut. Col. —, the Commanding Officer, for his further directions. I have the honor to be,
Your most obedient Servant,
—, Captain — Infantry.—
Madras Herald, July 9.

This morning's post brings us accounts of a most melancholy accident at Vizagapatam, involving a serious loss of life. Mr. Mason the Collector, who had previously been much indisposed, was to have embarked on the evening of Wednesday the 2d, on the *John William Dare*. A party went off in the boat with him—Messrs. Arbutnot, Harris and Crozier and Doctor Desormeaux—and in the last surf the boat was unhappily swamped, and poor Mr. Mason met a watery grave! The other gentlemen saved themselves by swimming. Mr. Mason's corpse had been brought on shore and that of one peon, three other peons and several boatmen were still reported missing. It is considered most providential that the tide was not making at the fatal moment, or not a soul would in all probability have escaped to tell the tale! It may be as well to add, to satisfy any anxious doubts that may still be entertained regarding the gentlemen whose names we have above enumerated, that our informant mentions having seen them all safe subsequent to the melancholy occurrence.—*Ibid*.

CALCUTTA.

THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.
As the time draws near when—within perhaps the next hour—the public anxiety will be satisfied with intelligence of Mr. Macaulay's arrival at Ootakamund, and that the new constitution of the Indian Government has been proclaimed, conjecture is rife as to the manner in which the Governor General will obtain a quorum of Members at the Neelgherries to give efficiency to the new Council; for it is provided in the forty-eighth Section of the Act, "that all Laws and regulations shall be made at some Meeting of the Council at which the said Governor General and at least three of the Ordinary Members of Council shall be assembled, and that all other functions of the said Governor General in Council be exercised by the said Governor General, and one or more Ordinary Member or Members of Council." The presence of Colonel Morrison alone would satisfy the point of form for all business except that of making "Laws and Regulations,"—if there be nothing informal in proceeding to business at the Neelgherries before the installation of the entire Council, that is, in the absence of any Member now in India, and without a majority of its Ordinary Members on the spot—points upon which we do not feel competent to offer an opinion. But it is clear that the superior functions of Government, those of legislation, cannot be undertaken unless three Ordinary Members are present, and there are but two immediately available, Colonel Morrison and Mr. Macaulay, and there is only one besides in India, Mr. Blunt, who is now in Calcutta, for Sir Charles Metcalfe is Governor of Agra, and unable to take any other functions, but that of Governor General in case of a vacancy, and Mr. Ross is at the Cape, and Mr. Martin gone home. Hence though Colonel Morrison, nominated by the Court as a provisional Member, becomes an acting Member, there would still be a vacancy including Mr. Blunt. Now the Act declares (Section) 64 "That if any vacancy shall happen in the office of an Ordinary Member of Council of India, when no person provisionally or otherwise appointed to succeed thereto shall be then present on the spot, then and on every such occasion such vacancy shall be supplied by the appointment of Governor General in Council." Here we discover the means of filling up the Council at the Neelgherries, and of obtaining a quorum for all purposes without calling in Mr. Blunt. If indeed Sir Charles Metcalfe were relieved from the Vice Presidency, which has rather anomalously been continued hitherto, from the necessity of the case, by the appointment of Mr. Blunt as Governor of Bengal, which is an appointment strictly in accordance with the Act, the Governor General would have the power of nominating temporarily two Ordinary Members of Council, and the Council might then be installed in all its plenitude at the Neelgherries. In regard to the nominations, there is no restriction, except that they must be Civil or Military servants of the Company: it matters not to which presidency they belong. It so happens that there is at present at Ootakamund a gentleman whom the favor of the Court of Directors, by nominating him a provisional Member of Council for Bombay, has marked as a man whose appointment would be likely to meet with their entire ap-

probation, we mean Mr. Ironside. It is therefore inferred by many that Mr. Ironside will be the third Ordinary Member, rather than any one of the Bengal Gentlemen of his Lordship's Suite, in spite of the eminent qualifications of more than one of them,—especially as their services are indispensable in their executive duties. This is but an *ad hoc*, a mere conjecture, but it appears at least probable—whether another vacancy will be made by the appointment of a Governor of Bengal, even conjecture is silent.—*Calcutta Courier*, July 2.

In our speculations yesterday upon supposed vacancies in Council, we overlooked the distinction between a vacancy in the literal sense and an official vacancy. A Member of Council proceeding to Europe makes an official vacancy, and therefore Mr. Martin is succeeded by Colonel Morrison; but in the same manner as Mr. Lushington, while presiding over the Government of Madras, was (before the remedial Act of 1831) legally in possession of his seat in Parliament so a Member of Council going to the Cape or elsewhere "within the Company's limits, does not vacate his seat in Council. Mr. Ross's absence makes no vacancy. This indeed we were perfectly aware of; but recollecting how such cases had been met under the old Charter by temporary appointments of the Governor-General; we in our simplicity suppose that of course the Governor-General was equally furnished with so necessary a power under the new. There however we find ourselves mistaken. The 34th Section of the Charter of 1813 provides.

"That if any of the Members of the Council of either of the said Presidencies shall by any infirmity or other cause be rendered incapable of acting, or of attending to act as such, or if any of such Members shall be absent from the Presidency, and the Governor-General, or either of the said Governors, shall be desirous of having the Advice of a full Council upon any urgent Business, the Governor-General or such Governors respectively, shall by virtue of this Act have full Power and Authority to call any provisional Successor appointed then on the Spot, or there being none such on the Spot, then any senior Merchant on the Spot, to assist at the Council Board for that Turn."

Most unaccountably this section has been omitted in the late Act, which contains no provision whatever to make temporary appointments to Council in cases of absence.

We observe also that, as the office of Deputy Governor of Bengal is to be held by "one of the Ordinary Members of Council," who is to "receive no additional salary by reason of such appointment," no vacancy in Council can arise from investing one of its members with that dignity. *Ibid*, 3 July.

Mr. Minchin.—A curious story is going the rounds of the Calcutta coteries regarding this gentleman's appointment to the Law Commission. It seems he is playing shuttlecock between Cannon and Leadenhall Streets, while the President of the Board of Control and the Chairman of the Court of Directors hold the battledores. The story goes that both parties wish to appoint him, but neither will. Mr. Grant says to the Chair, if you appoint, I'll confirm—and the head of the Direction answers, in the same tone.—No, I cannot appoint—but, I will confirm if the Board of Control agree to nominate.—Now, we should infer from this that neither party cares to see Mr. Minchin in the legislative capacity; for, if there was any anxiety about the matter, there could be no hesitation in respect to the appointment. The order of nomination and confirmation is mere matter of form, and has no effect whatever on the degrees of responsibility attaching to the several authorities. *Fitness* should constitute the ground of an appointment, and the conviction of the propriety of an appointment should guide its confirmation. Thus, whoever names Mr. Minchin as a Law Commissioner is just as responsible to the country as him who approves of the nomination, and vice versa.

If we were in Mr. Minchin's place we would withdraw our pretensions altogether, for there can be nothing very gratifying one's feeling in finding men in high places ashamed to recognize publicly their protégé.

We hear nothing about Mr. Martin or Mr. Anderson, now in connection with this Law Commission. Are they too, like the person we have *minchin-ed*, between too stools?—*Englishman*, July 2.

The Iron Steamer *Lord William Bentinck* is advertised to start for Allahabad, with the Experiment in two, about the middle of this month, and it is calculated she will reach Allahabad in twenty days. We understand there are two excellent Cabins in the Experiment available for passengers, and we hear that there are already several applications for them. She will be principally laden with treasure, as on her last trip.

The Steam was got up yesterday in the *Lord William Bentinck* for a first trial of her engines at a little before seven A.M. and she proceeded up the river as far as Barrackpore, and returned passing the New Mint in four hours and forty-one minutes from the time of weighing anchor, having run both ways against the tide, without stopping: she then proceeded down to Fort Gloster, partly with the tide, in an hour and forty minutes, and remained there three hours and a half. Starting on her return at 5 P.M. against a strong ebb, she reached Calcutta in two hours and three quarters, and anchored off Chandpaul Ghat about a quarter before eight. Her speed through the water averaged about 8 miles and 3 quarters, drawing 2 feet 3 inches with her complement of Coal on board. We hear that the machinery in every respect answered expectation, and there was not the slightest vibration perceptible in the vessel, and that great credit is due to the engineer, Mr. Jones, who superintended their erection and adjustment.—*Calcutta Courier*, July 4.

REMARKS ON THE OVERLAND INVASION OF INDIA AND ON BRITISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. BY LIEUTENANT CONOLLY.

My journey having afforded me peculiar opportunities of judging parts of this oft-discussed, and ever-

interesting question, I venture to exhibit the result of some reflections formed upon it during my travels. I will not attempt to embrace, within the limits of this sketch, the arguments belonging to all parts of so extended a subject, but rather confine myself to such as are connected with the politics of Asia. Adequately to treat on these, I should be familiar with countries of which I have only seen portions, and concerning which my information is necessarily imperfect; but I will not therefore be deterred from submitting, to the judgment of others, opinions upon points, which appear to me deserving of serious consideration.

Twenty-three years ago, France threatened our possessions in Hindoostan, and the British Government deemed it expedient to send ambassadors to the Shahs of Persia and Afghanistan, to secure their friendship, and so provide against the danger. We need not now busy ourselves in debating, whether or no the French could have carried their great threats into execution, for the events of late years have entirely altered our political relations with France, Russia, and Persia, and reduced the arguments upon this question within a much more tangible compass. Instead of fearing France, we hope that for the future our interests will be allied;—but, in our endeavours to crush the power of Napoleon, we gave strength to Russia, who has more than taken the position in Asia that Napoleon aspired to;—for France intrigued from a distance, to gain the influence over Persia, that Russia now commands from her adjoining frontier; and so far has the latter power thrown forward her boundary of late years, and so marked a contrast does she present to the nations on her east that we may now speculate upon the probable as well as the possible effects of her politics upon the countries of Central Asia.

The Russians have long been credited with views upon our Eastern possessions, and doubtless they have entertained them, although their designs have necessarily been distant, and very indefinite. Perhaps it is speaking more accurately to say, that the Russians have long been anxious to have it in their power to attack us in India, in case of a quarrel rendering such a measure expedient;—and whether they now can, or hereafter will probably be able to do this, is the point for discussion.

Blackwood's Magazine for September, 1827, is headed by an able and full treatise upon the subject of Indian invasion; written by a gentleman, who, to great talent, adds much knowledge of eastern countries, and experience of eastern character. I had thrown my opinions into a loose sketch, similar to the ensuing one before the above-mentioned treatise was pointed out to me; I have never seen it before, whenever my views coincide with its writer's, I set a value upon them.

It is with this question, as with most others, few will take a medium view of its merits. One party will insist upon drawing a parallel between the light troops of former Asiatic armies, and those of Europe in the present day, and argue, that because Timur Lung, Mahmood of Ghuzni, the Emperor Babbar, and Nadir Shah, all rode to Hindoostan, the Russians can make a dash through the countries which separate our frontiers, and turn us out of India before we have time to prepare for defence;—while the opposite class treat the whole question as chimerical and dispose of it by a few general remarks upon the great difficulties of the march,—the national poverty of the Russians, and the instability of their government,—that many political ills must elapse before they can mature their plans,—and the great control that we have over their commerce, I will endeavour to hold a moderate course between these two extreme opinions, yet not be restrained by the fear of being thought an alarmist, from submitting the consideration of possible occurrences, however remotely they may bear up upon the question.

The invasion of India is not an event that we have to fear immediately. Some years must elapse before the Russians can themselves advance, or extend their influence, to points whence they can make a fair start; but distant and uncertain though the danger may be, it certainly is one that the British government should provide against, since the Russians can still extend their power eastward, and since it is their interest to do so, in order to increase their commerce and render it more independent, and to obtain command of positions, whence they may threaten in Asia, the nation which controls them in Europe.

There are two great routes, and, I conceive, only two, by which the Russians can invade India. They will either establish themselves, or their controul at Khiva, and making that their base, will go up the Oxus to Balkh, and on over the Baucanean mountains, via Cabul and Peshawar to the Indus; or, taking the Persian frontier for a base, they will follow the great road through Afghanistan.

The mere distance that they would have to march either way, is less a matter for consideration than the natural facilities and difficulties of the countries, through which the route would lie, their political state, and the degree of assistance or otherwise, that their inhabitants probably would or could render to invaders. With regard to the first route, therefore, I will avail myself of such information as I was able to obtain on my journey, and that which has been furnished by Messrs. Moravieff and Meyendorff to suggest a few opinions upon the policy of the Russians to the east and north of the Caspian Sea, and the possible effects of it.

In taking a review of our journey into the Caspian desert, I alluded to the supposed intentions of the Russians upon Khiva, and from what we observed and learned, drew the conclusions,—that the Russians might form a settlement upon or near the east coast of the Caspian, and, that at a favorable season, a proper force of disciplined troops could easily march across the desert and capture Khiva; though I doubted, whether the Russians could well sustain themselves at that place, according to Mr. Moravieff's plan.

Moravieff's idea, I believe, was in the first instance, to obtain the co-operation of some of the coast Toorkmans, through their aid to march on Khiva, and to establish himself there by the assistance of those whom he would liberate from captivity, the aborigines, and the discontented of all parties.—Mr. Moravieff was a prisoner during his stay at Khiva, therefore his information could not well be certain. All accounts that we could obtain, lead me to think, that there are not so many hundred Russian slaves at Khiva, as he was to thousands, and these could all be taken out of the way. The slaves of other nations, who remained, would for the most part be desirous rather to return to their homes, than to remain under Russian rule; but they would find it difficult to get away, and some of these and the original cultivators of the fine Oasis which surrounds Khiva, would doubtless be of service to the conquerors. Still, if in spite of every obstacle, the Russians succeeded in sustaining themselves at Khiva their communications with the Caspian would be very un-

I find this error so fully confuted in the treatise alluded to in *Blackwood's Magazine*, that rather than enlarge upon it, I will refer my readers to that book.

Many persons have speculated upon our being invaded from the south of Persia, by troops shipped in the gulf or by an army marched along the coast, and supplied with provisions from the sea, in improvement upon the march of Alexander the Great; but this is almost supposing us to have no ships on the ocean.

certain and it is difficult to imagine of what use such an insulated and distant post would be to them.

Baron Meyendorff, who, in 1820, went on a mission from Orenburgh to Bokhara, assisted Moravieff's plan, by showing how Khiva could be brought considerably more within reach of the Russians, than it at present is from another quarter. According to his itinerary, two-thirds of the distance from Orenburgh to the Aral sea, are through easy hills of clay, in which there is plenty of water. Grain and forage can be raised in the valleys of these hills: they appear to form a stronger frontier than the present one upon the Oural river; and at the expense of a few slight fortifications, they might be made impervious to the Nomad tribes at their foot. To the end of these hills, to "Monts Moughodar," it is a distance of about 434; it appears that the Russians could extend their frontier thus far, and a glance at a map will explain, better than I in many words could, the advantages of such a position.

Hence, according to the same authority, it would be very practicable to march to Khiva. The Baron points out a land route by which Khiva might be best approached.—"A Pouest, l'Aral est bordé par la chaîne des monts Karaghounbet; ce serait en longeant ces montagnes, à une distance de cinq, dix, et quinze verstes de la mer d'Aral, que des troupes Russes pourraient approcher le plus facilement de Khiva;"—and on the other hand, he shows that they might carry boats or rafts to the Aral sea, and coast it to the mouth of the Oxus which they might descend, to Khiva.

"Cette communication par eau entre le Sir et Khiva est fréquentée par de pauvres Kirghiz, et c'est un simple capotage."

As far as the River Sir or beyond it, it appears that the Russians might count upon assistance from the Kirghiz, who are partly tributary to them, and nearly all enemies to the Khivians. Meyendorff relates, that when the Russian Mission went to Bokhara—on the fine banks of the river Ilek, they joined the camp of "le puissant Soltan Kirghiz, Haroon-Ghazi-A-boul-Ghazi," who waited with some hundreds of devoted Kirghiz, to escort them to the Sir—"pour témoigner par cette acte de brenveillance, tout l'attachement qu'il portait au gouvernement Russe, dont, à la vérité, il avait grand besoin à cause de ses querelles avec le Khan de Khiva."

And Meyendorff not only dilates upon the influence which the Russians have already acquired over this people, but anticipates the period when they will be generally tributary to Russia. He writes—"Dans les deux autres hordes les Khans doivent être confirmés dans leur dignité par la Russie, qui exerce même une grande influence sur leur nomination, et qui leur fait prêter serment de fidélité. De même que les hordes nomades des Turcomans paient un tribut au Khan de Khiva et de Boukharie, de même les Kirghiz pourront un jour devenir tributaires de l'Empereur de Russie; mais il faut d'abord leur en faire sentir le besoin, et leur prouver ainsi l'efficacité d'une protection dont ils sentent bientôt tout le prix."

If it is rightly said, that the Kaka, Kalpaks, on the South of the Aral sea, are oppressed, poor, and discontented, they might rise to assist, or refrain from attempts to oppose the invaders, and thus the whole road would be open to them; but be this as it may, by throwing on their frontier from Orenburgh to Monts Moughodar, the Russians would be able immediately to influence the desert tribes nearest to them; and always having it in their power to force a passage to Khiva, they would greatly support any of their countrymen established there according to Mr. Moravieff's plan.

In pointing out what I conceive to be difficulties in the latter officer's undertaking, I have not alluded to the course that the king of Bokhara might think proper to adopt. Long as the two states have been at enmity, the king of Bokhara would scarcely be pleased to see the Oosbegs of Khiva supplanted by men of an infidel nation, whose vicinity would be so much more alarming to him; but the great shortening of the distance between his frontier, and that of Russia might possibly have the effect of checking his disposition to attack the new comers, and induce him more readily to any proposition that came from their government.

The Russians seem to imagine that as their object, when established at Khiva, would be to increase the cultivation there, and to encourage commerce, so as to draw riches to the country, the Toorkmans, finding themselves still in possession of their beloved desert, and more cheaply supplied with the necessities and luxuries of their life than before, might be conciliated, and brought to transfer to the "white Emperor" the allegiance they now unwillingly render to their Oosbeg conquerors. It is to be presumed, that the Russians have some good reasons for thinking thus, and therefore I may venture a few speculations. The Toorkmans, as I before observed, are greatly divided among what we saw of them, I cannot think that they have sufficient regard for the religion they profess, to forget their quarrels, and unite against infidels for the sake of it. Their present hatred of the Oros is extreme, because it proceeds from an indefinite fear of great evil; but when they saw the extent of their loss by the coming of the Russians, I conceive they would make up their minds to bear it;—barbarians, they would admire a people whose military power they had felt to be so great, and were the Russians to take a few thousand of the most influential among them into trilling regular pay, others might be inclined to follow. I am sure that the Toorkmans would be chiefly influenced by what they thought their interests, and when I look to what we have done in Hindoostan, or to speak nearer to the point, what the Russians have done in Persia, I cannot decide, that they may not subdue these Tartars; but in what period of time they could bring their Roman system to bear upon them, or could make either the country, or its people, available for their ulterior purposes, I will not attempt to determine.

So much for the Russians own means of taking Khiva. In asserting, that they had better means of attaining their object, through the assistance of Persia, I believe I said no more than the Russians themselves are aware of, for since the last war, they have proposed to Abbas Meerza, to join with them in an expedition to crush a horde so especially obnoxious to Iran, to liberate their captives, and secure Persia against future eruptions.

Abbas Meerza may send 5,000 disciplined troops, half of them Russian deserters in his pay; and through his influence, can be obtained light cavalry suited to the service, and every supply requisite for the march. The Goltan Toorkmans, being subservient to Persia, and having a long standing and bitter feud with the Khivians, would lend their assistance; and Abbas Meerza could command the services of his Koord subjects on the border, who are old enemies of the Tekkiah Toorkmans, and quite a match for them. The whole force would rendezvous at Astrabad.

At Tiflis, I saw Persians of the provinces ceded to the Russians, belonging to an irregular corps of 1,500 men, who, under their commandant, Prince Galitzin, had fought gallantly against the Turks.—Nay, there was a troop of Turks, who having taken part with the Russians, had fought boldly against their brethren. Many of these horsemen were decorated with medals and crosses. The great count of Eriwan, who took pride in showing his troops, remarked—"We have taken a hint from you in India: those fellows, who, as enemies, ran before us, when backed by our cannon fought like heroes."

where supplies and camels to carry them could be got together. In spring or winter, with such assistance, I conceive that the Russians would make light of the difficulties of a march across the desert to Khiva. The enemy might harass them with skirmishing attacks, but they would probably only attempt regular battle, to be convinced of the danger and inability of it. It is hardly to be imagined, that the fine country round Khiva could be entirely laid waste, or that all the people inhabiting the town and its neighbourhood would leave it. If they withdrew there long, because they would not find sufficient forage for their cattle: the invaders would command their supplies both of Khiva and in Persia, and it is therefore probable, that the greater part of them would come to terms.

The only place of retreat, for those who persisted in enmity, would be Bokhara. The two states have long been at variance, and in the event of their allying themselves, it is questionable, whether they could unitedly defeat an army of Russians and Persians. The king of Bokhara can call many thousand horsemen to the field, but it appears, that the Khivians are the better soldiers, and I believe it is a well understood fact, that scarcely any number of irregular cavalry can make serious impression upon a moderate force of disciplined troops. It is but twelve days march, through an easy country, from Khiva to Bokhara, so that the monarch of the latter capital would have his immediate interests to look to. It may be doubted, in the first instance, how far his prudence would allow him to enter into hostilities with two such powers as Persia and Russia; but if pride or fanaticism impelled him to a struggle, I conceive that a few trials would convince him of his inability to cope with such a combined enemy; and it would be to little purpose his keeping up a desultory war, as Bokhara is a place where an army could well sustain itself, and the invaders could follow up their advantage, if necessary, with fresh troops.

From these considerations, I venture to draw the conclusions, that though the called invaders might at first be resisted, they could keep their ground, and that after a while, all parties would look to their interests and come to terms. Should it be thought expedient, a colony of Persian subjects, Khoords, or Goltan Toorkmans, might be established at Khiva, and strengthened against other tribes, according to the approved system of these countries.

What arrangement would then be made between the Russians and Persians, is perhaps uncertain. It need not be doubted, that the Russians would at once assume the government at Khiva, with Persian assistance, to sustain them there, if they could conveniently do so; but should such a plan not appear immediately expedient, with the assent and concurrence of the Persians, they might perhaps establish there an Asiatic state, tributary to the Emperor of Russia; or they could make Karazm a Persian province, leave Khiva in the hands of their allies, and support the latter in every way, until it suited them to take the place into their own possession. Prussian influence must be great wherever Persian rule is established, and while Russia can effectually serve or menace Persia, she can order such arrangements as best answer her own views, but until the Russians are themselves established at Khiva, they will not be able vigorously to advance their projects, and therefore, although they may not consider the country to the yet in a proper state to receive them, their eventual aim will be, to make it fit, and to occupy it, and upon the supposition of their succeeding in doing so, I ground my speculations.

I do not think, that I have set this conquest in too easy a light. I am aware, that it is next to impossible to conquer desert tribes by mere force, because they are an intangible enemy; but when their range is circumscribed, and they are dependent upon certain quarters for the necessities of life, they may be starved into subjection by the powers who command their supplies; and I do conceive, that by the hearty co-operation of Persia with Russia, the greater number of the Toorkmans, now between the Persian frontier and Khiva, might be subjected or driven out of the country. I must, however, add, that although the plan for this would be simple enough, it would require some years for its execution, and for its success, more energy and firmness of character than has hitherto been displayed by the Persian government.

I would particularly remark upon the hostility that has long subsisted between the Shah of Bokhara and the Khan of Khiva, and the circumstance, that the people of the smaller state, being more warlike and unsettled in their habits, are enabled to, and often do seriously annoy, the quieter inhabitants of the rich province of Bokhara. These are not circumstances strong enough to make the Shah of Bokhara wish to change his neighbours for Russians, or for Persians; but they might be inducements to him to fall in with an evil that he felt he could not avoid. Seeing that he could not prevent the Russians from coming to take Khiva on some terms, he might be disposed to court their alliance, rather than to provoke their vengeance by continued opposition, or half-measures of friendship; then the Russians, giving him their aid to settle the country, which is now but nominally his own, might gradually extend his dominions in the direction of Hindoostan, and establishing over Toorana controul similar to that which they now exercise over Persia, they might use these two empires as levers to their other weighty projects in Asia.

I have ventured to shape out a course of events, from what appears to me the most probable of several possible accidents, because unless some of them come to pass, we need not fear attack from this quarter.—The Russians cannot invade us through the countries as they now stand between the Oural and the Indus; but if they can establish their authority at Khiva so firmly as to be able to base their operations upon that place, the invasion of India, though still a difficult, would be by no means an impracticable undertaking.

I assume, that the Oxus is navigable, because my information tells me, that it is so during eight months of the year; and I conceive, that the first undertaking

where supplies and camels to carry them could be got together.

In spring or winter, with such assistance, I conceive that the Russians would make light of the difficulties of a march across the desert to Khiva. The enemy might harass them with skirmishing attacks, but they would probably only attempt regular battle, to be convinced of the danger and inability of it. It is hardly to be imagined, that the fine country round Khiva could be entirely laid waste, or that all the people inhabiting the town and its neighbourhood would leave it. If they withdrew there long, because they would not find sufficient forage for their cattle: the invaders would command their supplies both of Khiva and in Persia, and it is therefore probable, that the greater part of them would come to terms.

The only place of retreat, for those who persisted in enmity, would be Bokhara. The two states have long been at variance, and in the event of their allying themselves, it is questionable, whether they could unitedly defeat an army of Russians and Persians. The king of Bokhara can call many thousand horsemen to the field, but it appears, that the Khivians are the better soldiers, and I believe it is a well understood fact, that scarcely any number of irregular cavalry can make serious impression upon a moderate force of disciplined troops. It is but twelve days march, through an easy country, from Khiva to Bokhara, so that the monarch of the latter capital would have his immediate interests to look to. It may be doubted, in the first instance, how far his prudence would allow him to enter into hostilities with two such powers as Persia and Russia; but if pride or fanaticism impelled him to a struggle, I conceive that a few trials would convince him of his inability to cope with such a combined enemy; and it would be to little purpose his keeping up a desultory war, as Bokhara is a place where an army could well sustain itself, and the invaders could follow up their advantage, if necessary, with fresh troops.

From these considerations, I venture to draw the conclusions, that though the called invaders might at first be resisted, they could keep their ground, and that after a while, all parties would look to their interests and come to terms. Should it be thought expedient, a colony of Persian subjects, Khoords, or Goltan Toorkmans, might be established at Khiva, and strengthened against other tribes, according to the approved system of these countries.

What arrangement would then be made between the Russians and Persians, is perhaps uncertain. It need not be doubted, that the Russians would at once assume the government at Khiva, with Persian assistance, to sustain them there, if they could conveniently do so; but should such a plan not appear immediately expedient, with the assent and concurrence of the Persians, they might perhaps establish there an Asiatic state, tributary to the Emperor of Russia; or they could make Karazm a Persian province, leave Khiva in the hands of their allies, and support the latter in every way, until it suited them to take the place into their own possession. Prussian influence must be great wherever Persian rule is established, and while Russia can effectually serve or menace Persia, she can order such arrangements as best answer her own views, but until the Russians are themselves established at Khiva, they will not be able vigorously to advance their projects, and therefore, although they may not consider the country to the yet in a proper state to receive them, their eventual aim will be, to make it fit, and to occupy it, and upon the supposition of their succeeding in doing so, I ground my speculations.

I do not think, that I have set this conquest in too easy a light. I am aware, that it is next to impossible to conquer desert tribes by mere force, because they are an intangible enemy; but when their range is circumscribed, and they are dependent upon certain quarters for the necessities of life, they may be starved into subjection by the powers who command their supplies; and I do conceive, that by the hearty co-operation of Persia with Russia, the greater number of the Toorkmans, now between the Persian frontier and Khiva, might be subjected or driven out of the country. I must, however, add, that although the plan for this would be simple enough, it would require some years for its execution, and for its success, more energy and firmness of character than has hitherto been displayed by the Persian government.

I would particularly remark upon the hostility that has long subsisted between the Shah of Bokhara and the Khan of Khiva, and the circumstance, that the people of the smaller state, being more warlike and unsettled in their habits, are enabled to, and often do seriously annoy, the quieter inhabitants of the rich province of Bokhara. These are not circumstances strong enough to make the Shah of Bokhara wish to change his neighbours for Russians, or for Persians; but they might be inducements to him to fall in with an evil that he felt he could not avoid. Seeing that he could not prevent the Russians from coming to take Khiva on some terms, he might be disposed to court their alliance, rather than to provoke their vengeance by continued opposition, or half-measures of friendship; then the Russians, giving him their aid to settle the country, which is now but nominally his own, might gradually extend his dominions in the direction of Hindoostan, and establishing over Toorana controul similar to that which they now exercise over Persia, they might use these two empires as levers to their other weighty projects in Asia.

I have ventured to shape out a course of events, from what appears to me the most probable of several possible accidents, because unless some of them come to pass, we need not fear attack from this quarter.—The Russians cannot invade us through the countries as they now stand between the Oural and the Indus; but if they can establish their authority at Khiva so firmly as to be able to base their operations upon that place, the invasion of India, though still a difficult, would be by no means an impracticable undertaking.

I assume, that the Oxus is navigable, because my information tells me, that it is so during eight months of the year; and I conceive, that the first undertaking

"In all the regions of the earth (says the Arabian traveller Ibn Haukal) there is not a more delightful and flourishing country than Mawarannahr—especially the district of Bokhara. If a person stand on its ancient citadel and cast his eyes around, nothing is visible on any side but beautiful green and luxuriant herbage, so that he might imagine the green of the earth, and the azure of the skies, to be blended with each other."

"The vales and buildings and cultivated plains of Bokhara extended above thirteen farsangs by twelve &c."

"Des espaces que s'étendant au-delà de nos sentiers avec un sol admirable; on n'y voit pas un pied de terre laissé inculte."—Meyendorff.

We made many inquiries about the Oxus, and the accounts we received agreed in the main points. From above Balkh to past Khiva, the river has an average breadth of a half a mile. [One informant, who stated this, said, that he first crossed the river above Balkh, and again on his way from Bokhara, at Charjoob]. When the snows melt on the mountains, from which the Oxus flows, it runs in a broad and very rapid stream, which it would be dangerous to come down, and very difficult to ascend; this excess of water runs off in 24 months or so, and then the river runs broadly and moderately, having depth sufficient to float boats of large burden. There are boats at the ferries that take across 12 camels. The general account said, that there were no fords, but that travellers often crossed on inflated skins. In winter the Oxus is frozen.

ing of the Russians, after settling themselves at Khiva, would be to throw open this river, up which they might then convey troops and stores, as well as their manufactures, to Balkh.

Were Khiva regularly occupied by the Russians, it would, there is little doubt, be stocked by Armenians, Jews, and other commercial people, and, as I observed, when treating of our trade beyond the Indus, Balkh would become a large town, corresponding to Khiva. At Balkh much of the produce of India would be exchanged for Russian exports, the people would become commercial and numerous, and the naturally fertile country round invaders might draw supplies.

The route hence to Caubul would lie through the passes of the Hindoo Koosh mountains. This, though not a very long, would be an extremely laborious journey, for provisions must be carried all the way and there would be difficulty in transporting artillery and stores over these stupendous mountains. However, the passes are practicable during six months of the year.

From Caubul, the road goes through a mountainous, but very passable and well watered, country, via Jellalabad and Peshawar, to Attock, where the invaders would cross into the Punjab, except they passed the river higher up, for the purpose of occupying the strong country of Cashmere.*

At Attock, then, I will suppose the Russians arrived, and there leave them, to take a view of the second route by which they may advance to India:—a route concerning which my information is more certain, and which, whether we regard the political or the natural condition of the countries through which it lies, offers surer and more immediate means for such an undertaking.

Whatever the Russians may do in Toorkistan, many years will be requisite to bring their plans to maturity. Possibly circumstances may delay hostility between us until such time as they are able to invade India from both quarters; but it is through Afghanistan that the attack will be chiefly conducted, if ever it is made, because it is in this direction that the Russians can most easily push on the Persians, and increase the resources of the country, by substituting a settled for a pastoral people.

Overawing the Persians from their own south-eastern frontier, the Russians can command a road through their neighbours' empire, wherever it may extend to; and, by a parity of reasoning, they can feel confident that through this extent of country a retreat would be left open to them.

The Persian frontier, I assume, would be the line from which the Russians would make their last start for India, and it is probable that this frontier will soon be thrown considerably more eastward. Afghanistan, in its present disunited state, offers every temptation to the encroachment of the Persians; and Herat, which I have shown they claim as the ancient capital of Khorassan, will, there is little doubt, ere long, fall into their hands. I will not here enter into speculations regarding the further extension of their empire in the direction of India, but remark merely that, settled at Herat, their influence would extend at least to Candahar.

The roads from the present Russian frontier to Herat are practicable for an European army. Troops might be transported across the Caspian to Astrabad—thence marched by the roads shown in the journal to Meshed, and on from the holy city, by the two described routes, to Herat; or be marched from Astrabad across the mountains to Neshapore, where they could as well be supplied with provisions as at Meshed. Or an army might march from the Arras, by the high road via Tabreez and Teheran, to Neshapore, where they might strike off through the fertile province of Toorkistan, to join the Toor but-e-Hyderah road to Herat.

Herat could be made a place of considerable strength: nothing can well exceed the plenty and excellence of the supplies from the valley, and an army might be garrisoned there for years, with every necessary immediately within its reach.

The country between Herat and Candahar, though hilly, would offer little obstacle to the march of an unopposed European army: water is in sufficiency, and partial supplies might be procured on the way. The neighbourhood of Candahar could furnish abundant supplies, and an army would be comfortably situated there if the people were well disposed towards it.

The situation of the latter capital marks it for a pivot, upon which the operations of the expedition would turn: for there the greatest difficulties of the march would commence, there the invaders must establish themselves firmly, make a disposition for their advance towards India, and provide for their retreat from it.

From Candahar they would either go via Ghuzni up to Caubul, and thence on through the before described country to Attock; or through the for the most part, barren and difficult country via Pishen, Quetta, Dauder, and Bough, they would march south to the Indus about Shikarpore.

The first is not a difficult road during nine months of the year, but it is next to impassable in winter, by reason of the heavy snow that falls, and the extreme rigour of the climate, in the neighbourhood of Ghuzni especially. "The country," says Foster, "has generally a barren aspect, with a scanty supply of wood and water." Supplies of food are not to be looked for in great quantities from the pastoral people, who side the road, and Ghuzni is no longer a town of any consequence.

With regard to the second route, partial supplies of provisions might be obtained in the valley of Pishen, and at the towns of Quetta, Dauder, and Bough, and a sufficiency of such as the country produces at Shikarpore. The want of both water and wood must be often experienced on this road, and I can say no more regarding it, than that it could be taken by a befriended army during the favourable season of the year. At the best time the train of an European army would suffer much injury from the roughness of the passes between Quetta and Dauder, and during summer this tract of country is impassable.

Having now brought the Russians by two grand routes, from Persia through Afghanistan to the Indus, I will briefly recapitulate the opinions that I have stated. I conceive that a Russian army sufficient in numbers and equipment for the invasion of India, could march without great difficulty to Herat; in other words, that the roads are practicable for an European army and its train, and that the country is capable of furnishing them with supplies. That the roads through the country between Herat and Candahar are not very difficult, and that both the last named cities are places where a large army could be supported. That the roads on from Candahar to the Indus, either via Caubul to Attock, or by the way of Quetta to Shikarpore, though they have their difficulties, (the last, especially,) and are at times closed, yet are practicable during the favourable seasons.

Now four the other side of the question.—The distance between the present Russian frontier and the Indus could not be marched in less than two campaigns;—say the first would bring the invaders to Candahar.

* There are passes above Attock into Cashmere, which were often used by the Afghans, when they had possession of the latter country. My accounts state, that the roads are not practicable for artillery.

† When I say that roads are not difficult, I mean either that they are at present practicable for an European army and its train, or that they might be made so by pioneers, without extraordinary labour.

dahar.* With every assistance the Russians would incur incalculable expense in such an enterprise—expense which they could at no time afford and which would fall upon them when they would need all their money for the war which they would have to sustain against us in Europe.

I have said that the undertaking is practicable, as far as regards the natural obstacles of the countries through which the march would lie, and the capabilities of these countries to furnish sufficient supplies at certain commissariat points;—but these points are far distant from each other, and supplies for consumption on the marches between them must be carried with the army. This would require very many beasts of burden:—camels, horses, mules, and galloways, are easily and cheaply to be obtained throughout these countries, but so large a demand for them would greatly raise their price, and they must carry every sort of food for themselves as well; for hardly any where on the line of march, from the Russian frontier to the Indus, would be found sufficient grass for the cattle of the smallest army, and to supply the deficiency, the invaders must carry chopped straw, which the people of those countries store as provender for their cattle.

Fuel is a very scarce article throughout Central Persia and Afghanistan: the expense of wood is generally felt even by the travellers of Kafilahs, and sometimes an absolute want of its experienced.

Water is not generally found in such abundance at the different stages on the roads through these countries as to admit of many cattle bating at the same place on the same day; a large army must therefore divide its columns and submit to much delay in marching from one great point to another; and in many instances very fatiguing marches must be made in order to procure a sufficiency of this grand necessary for the smallest division of such a force, unless a supply were carried with it when necessary. The last remedy brings an increase to the evil of an immense train of baggage cattle.

Spirituous liquors, necessary in such quantities for European soldiers, must be brought from the starting point; for with the exception of a very small quantity of bad arrack, (made for their own use by the few Jews or Armenians who inhabit the cities,) no strong liquor could be obtained on the way. This argument may be applied to nearly every other store required by an European army.

Changes of climate and food, very prejudicial to the health of Europeans must be encountered: as, for instance, on descending from the mountains to the plain of Kutch, instead of wheat and barley the comparatively unwholesome grains of bajra and jawarree must be eaten; nor must I omit to anticipate the illness that the invaders would probably suffer on exchanging mountain water for that of the Indian plains, the effects of which are far more deleterious than Europeans generally suppose.

In speculating upon the chances of an overland invasion, we generally flatter ourselves that half our enemies would die of hard labour, bad diet, change of climate, and inclement weather, before they reached the Indus;—and, in truth, unless the Russians do considerably ameliorate the condition both of their commissariat and medical staff, we may reasonably calculate upon a great mortality among them before they exchange shots with us. I do not lay so much stress upon their exposure to bad weather, because the climate of Khorassan is regular; and if the Russians could afford time to come, they might choose their seasons, and indeed not burden themselves with a full equipment of tents; but what serious obstacles do not the different seasons oppose to the co-operation, to the very communication almost, of troops separated in some parts of Afghanistan itself, or in Afghanistan and India? During winter, troops at Caubul and Candahar could not march the one to the other;—during summer and early autumn the road south through the mountains to Quetta is closed; so that not only could not troops concert a simultaneous enterprise by the two routes to the Indus, but an army, pushed on by the southern road, would run the risk of being cut off from its reserve in Khorassan.

Some of these are obstacles to Russian invasion of India. There are others which have been noted by former writers, and there are some which cannot be definitively shown, because as it is uncertain under what circumstances the Russians would come, it is scarcely possible to calculate all the difficulties that they would have to encounter; but it is to be observed, that all the preceding observations set the understanding in its easiest light, for they suppose our enemies to be assisted by the people of Afghanistan, as well as by the Persians. Now if the Afghans, as a nation, were determined to resist the invaders, the difficulties of the march would be rendered well nigh insurmountable: for through Afghanistan is a country through which an unopposed European army could without very great difficulty march, its natural advantages are so many that the resolute people occupying it could greatly check, if not altogether prevent, the advance of an enemy into it; for if they could not keep the roads, they certainly could retain the possession of the mountainous country through which they lead, so as to have it in their power incessantly to harass the invaders, and probably to cut off their retreat in case they suffered serious reverse in Hindoostan.

The Afghans could put beyond reach, or destroy the partial supplies that might otherwise be obtained on the roads, and greatly straiten those upon which the invaders would depend at the large towns.

Many parts of the country between Herat and Candahar could be well defended. I am not able to speak confidently about the country separating Candahar from Caubul, but according to the description given of the ground between the latter city and Attock, nearly every foot of the way might be disputed; and I may safely affirm, that the southern road from Candahar to the Indus is one which could not be forced, if its many strong positions were defended with any resolution or military skill.

The first great road treated of, from the northward over the Hindoo Koosh mountains, I have supposed practicable for an unopposed army during half the year, but at no time I conceive could it be forced if the Afghans offered hearty opposition to an invading enemy; and to sum up these opinions, however desirous the Russians might be to invade British India, I am satisfied they could not, nor can I think that they would attempt to force their way either from the north or west, through Afghanistan to the Indus.

It appears then that from whichever anticipated quarter the Russians come to invade us in India, they must pass through Afghanistan, and that they are chiefly dependant upon the people of the latter country for the means of advancing to the Indus. Now the Afghans have little to gain, but much to fear, from letting the Russians enter their country: they are natural enemies to the nations by whom the Russians must in the first instance be assisted, whether Oosbeg or Persian, and they moreover cherish a strong fanatical antipathy against the latter people. The Afghans have little reason to fear us, and they

* I have here in view an army strong enough to hope for success against us in India, attended by its requisite train. I mean not to assert, that a small army of Russian troops might not march at once to the Indus, were it favoured by the aid of all people on the road;—supposing that promises of strong support were held out by disaffected parties in India to induce such an undertaking.

derive benefit from their commercial intercourse with our Indian provinces; we should therefore look upon them as our natural allies.

At the period when we apprehended invasion from the French, Mr. Elphinstone, who was sent as British ambassador to the court of Caubul, succeeded in establishing very friendly relations with the Doorraanee monarch. These were interrupted by a revolution, from the effects of which our neighbours have never recovered; but were they re-united and settled under one government, we might renew our connexion with them, and reasonably calculate upon their cordial assistance against the Russians as a common enemy. It may however be doubted whether, if certain evident schemes are allowed to take their course in Central Asia, the Afghans will not either cease to be a nation, or lose the power fully to serve us: for the Doorraanee monarchy is virtually dead, and in their present distracted state the Afghans cannot offer effectual opposition to the Persians, who will be quietly used by our rivals as an instrument to destroy the strongest barrier that could be established to protect India from invasion on the west.

Different opinions have been held regarding our fittest policy towards this nation. Afghanistan, some have argued, in its pastoral and distracted state, is probably a better defence to our eastern possessions than it would be were it settled under one government; for, in the latter case, there would be a greater extension of the fixed population, and the resources of the country would be more generally brought into action; therefore by using our influence to restore it to order, we should perhaps but be making provision for an invading enemy; and, it has been added, it might be impolitic in us to aid the re-establishment of one ruler instead of the many chiefs of opposed interests, with whom the Russians would have to treat for the means of advancing to the Indus, because none of these would be disposed to admit foreigners into their states, or to assist them in any way, except they were influenced by motives of interest or of alarm;—unassisted, our enemies could hardly make good their advance, and even the friendship of some native parties might be as bad as their enmity; for the favor of such chiefs as were to be bribed we could bid as high as our enemies, and by sending a few of our disciplined troops into the country of these brave mountaineers, to assist them in making the most of their natural defences, we could enable them to set all invaders at naught.

The last proceeding would be expedient in either case, and there is some reason in the first arguments, but in objection to them, recurs the danger that the different Afghan parties will be subjected by the Persians;—if not entirely, at least to such an extent as to incapacitate them from being very useful to us hereafter. But even if we could feel satisfied that the Persians would not encroach upon our neighbours, and that the latter would remain, as at present, the disunited and impoverished inhabitants of a generally barren, because pastoral, country, it is questionable whether it would be wise in us to leave them thus. The rulers of petty Afghanistan states cannot have the motives to oppose the foreign invasion of India that should be felt by a prince whose dignity and interests would in many ways be associated with ours; neither would they feel the same reasons for remaining steadfast in alliances that might be made with them; and there would probably be as much difficulty in managing their conflicting interests as in opposing the enemy. Singly the chief of a small state could not offer effectual opposition to an European invader, and it would be easy to gain him by encouraging his ambition against his rivals at home, or doubly to profit by it by directing it on India.

It would require great inducements to tempt a reigning prince from a sure and profitable alliance with us, (his superior and protecting power,) and to engage him in an undertaking which, at best is doubtful, would entail ruin upon him if it failed. It is difficult to believe that the intrigues of our enemies could so destroy the jealousy of an Afghan sovereign, and totally supersede our influence at his court, as to induce him to let the Russians establish themselves throughout the length of his dominions;—which they must do in order to the regular invasion of India, but which his permitting would be equal to the surrender of his independence and dignity.

The Russians could offer an Afghan sovereign nothing but promises, the fulfilment of which would depend on their success; but supposing always that they could hold out expectations sufficiently dazzling to seduce a prince in instance from honorable certain empire to the unworthy chance of greater, and that he should prove venal, with the hold that we should have upon him, we should be able to bribe up to our enemies' price, in case it were worth while to do so; at worst after some years friendly communication with this nation, we should not be without friends among them and early as it would be necessary for their prince to manifest his intentions, if they proved treacherous, we should have time enough to excite a revolution, and make a party for ourselves, or forcibly to occupy some passes leading from this mountainous country so as to keep the war out of our own as long as possible.

Moreover, with regard to the notion of our deriving security from the existence of many parties in Afghanistan, it is to be remarked that at present the country is not shared by many chiefs of opposed interests, but unequally divided between two families—rebel and ex-royalist: there may be jealousies between the different members of the rebel family, and their interests clash in this, that each party endeavours to make the most for himself without regard to the immediate welfare of the others, or to the prosperity of the people they rule over; but so long as the Suddozes retain a portion of the country, the Baurickzye Sirdars must keep together for the sake of their common cause.

Supposing these two families to preserve their relative positions till the anticipated day of invasion, the Russians would find a ready ally in the ex-royalists: with this aid they would hardly be a match for us, and the other party if we coalesced, since we should be in possession of the greatest portion of a strong country through which their route must lie. But this assumes, what is doubtful, that all the Afghans subject to the Baurickzye Sirdars, would make party with them; for, not to reason upon their desiring change from the oppression of these petty despots, the right of the Suddozes family to the supreme government has hitherto been considered sacred by the Doorraanees, and there would always be a strong feeling in their favor if they put themselves forward. Even though the Baurickzyes should entirely deprive the Suddozes family of rule in Afghanistan, for some years to come the name of the latter would serve invaders as a war-cry to raise as many adherents as they would pay for; but I conceive that I am putting unlikely cases, and that the Persians assuredly will advance, and settle the rival claims—by destroying both.

Could the Shah of Iran content himself with driving out the Suddozes from the ancient capital of Khorassan, the remainder of the once great Doorraanee empire would probably remain in the hands of the Baurickzye Sirdars. These might bequeath their states to their descendants, or themselves be supplanted by other upstarts; or possibly a chief, such as the present ruler of Caubul, would form

the different states into one, and, as we might expect to see petty revolutions, similar to those of the monarchy; but to recur to the Persian monarch take Herat, disposed to rest long on his arms, then march further eastward, if the Baurickzye not submit to retain their states under allegiance to his crown;—in either of which road to India would be greatly opened for the Russians.—*India Gazette.*

(To be continued.)

DELHI.

A petition was received from Nownehal Singh representing that in conformity to His Highness's orders, the building of the fort at Peshawar had been commenced upon the 3rd of Jeith, and soliciting that builders and bricklayers might be sent to expedite the work. A reply was sent directing the Castle or Citadel of Peshawar to be taken within the fort, and saying that builders and masons would soon be sent, also informing him that Missur Moolrani had been dispatched, and enjoining him to send for the most respectable people of the town, hold out to them promises of protection, and persuade them to resettle, and increase the revenues of the state,—giving them *kehlat*s according to their rank.

His Highness observed to Nehal Singh, an attendant of Sirdar Lehna Singh Mujhut, that Goojur Singh his master's brother, was addicted to drinking and loitering after courtesans,—the attendant represented he had relinquished those habits some time since. The Maharaja said he would send him and his Courtesans to Calcutta if he had not done so.

Missur Balaeram was ordered to pick out some valuable shawls, shawl-handkerchiefs, and neckcloths with the best matchlocks, &c. for presents, and to keep them apart after they had been inspected by the Sirkar, that the same would soon be dispatched to Calcutta for the Right Hon'ble the Governor General.

A maternal Aunt of the Maharaja, by name Mae Regnee, presented something in the shape of *Pursaud*, and said something to His Highness, who after enquiring about her health asked her where her son Ram Singh was. She replied he was in attendance on Sirdar Lehna Singh Mujhut, His Highness then dismissed her, giving her 500 Rupees and a pair of shawls.

A petition was received from Sirdar Hurree Singh Nulwa, stating that the building of the fort was rapidly progressing; that some of the principal people of the town had come forward, while others yet kept aloof thro' fear; but that he would get them to attend by promises of favor and protection.

Bhaee Ram Singh represented that the princes Hydar and Nassir, the sons of Shah Zuman were anxious to have an interview.—His Highness desired him to tell them that if they would accept of an allowance of 500 Rupees each per month, they might proceed to Peshawar and make arrangements for the administration of the country, in concert with Koonwur Nownehal Singh and Sirdar Hurree Singh Nulwa.—It having been urged again that they could not proceed without an outfit for the journey, and money for expenses, His Highness made no reply.

A petition was received from Ramlal, representing that about 10 or 11 thousand *Moolkeeds* had assembled in the pass of *Khyber*, but that under the Sirkar's auspices they should be completely routed—an answer was dispatched ordering him to concert with Sirdar Utar Singh of Sandhan, and Raja Soochet Singh, as soon as they joined him, and extirpate the rabble, and that more money would soon be sent him—a petition having been received from Moonshee Ramdoss representing that some of the Sikh followers of Koonwur Nownehal Singh had got drunk and wounded 4 or 5 Moosulmans, residents of Peshawar, in consequence of which the people of the town were much alarmed, a Shooqa was despatched to the Koonwur enjoining him not to let his Sikh followers drink liquor or commit any acts of violence or outrage on the inhabitants.

A petition was received from Sooltan Mahmood Darogha of Artillery, representing conformably to orders, he had dispatched 5 large Guns for the fort building at Peshawar.—*Delhi Gazette*, July 2.

EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE.

THE QUARTER'S REVENUE.—The accounts of the Revenue for the quarter ending on the 5th of April were not made up until a very late hour last night, and cannot, therefore, be officially promulgated until to-morrow; but we have reason to believe that we can give a tolerably correct estimate of the leading items of a document which is always looked to with considerable interest on the part of the public.

The first and most important item is the Excise. In the quarter ending on the 5th of April, 1833, this branch of the Revenue produced £2,600,575. The corresponding quarter of the present year gives an increase of more than £100,000 on this branch of receipt, notwithstanding the reductions in the duties raised from soap, tiles, &c. all of which are now in full operation.

In the next great item, the Customs, it will be recollected that the receipts for the corresponding quarter of last year were £3,417,250. In the present quarter we are gratified to learn that, in despite of many untoward circumstances this branch of receipt exhibits also a satisfactory increase, and that it exceeds the quarter of 1833 by more than £180,000.

In the minor items there are increases and decreases, which, on the whole, leave something like a balance—so that the total increase on the quarter may be fairly stated at more than £360,000.

Looking at the total income of the year, as compared with 1833, we fear there will be a very small increase; but an increase there undoubtedly is, notwithstanding the repeal of a very considerable amount of taxation, and a falling off of much more than £100,000 in the receipts under the head of Assessed Taxes, through a justifiable disinclina-

the collectors to press with too much their payment. Looking, however, at the state of our income and expenditure, and the flourishing condition of both manufactures, we think that even the will be declared the affords reason for, as well as a very abundant proof of, the management of the resources of the country, to be admitted to appertain to the Treasurer under the direction of Lord Althorp.—*Observer.*

GUARDIAN.—APRIL 5.

There is a French proverb—"he who reckons within his host, is obliged to reckon twice." It has thus happened to the Duke de Broglie, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had agreed to give a million sterling to settle the American claims relative to the Milan and Berlin decrees, without consulting the Chambers whether they would consent to it; and in return for this neglect of respect to the Legislature, the Legislature have refused to grant the supply. Chagrined at this defeat, he in a pet has resigned the seals. This was a money bill, and the Chambers asserted their right to discuss it. Had they tamely submitted to simply confirm what the Minister had no right to promise without their consent, it would have been a precedent of a most fatal description—it would have been the grave of their independence. As to the amount, Louis Philippe can easily pay it out of the spoil of the late King's privy list, of which he has an unlawful possession. Sebastiani, too, has retired: they can neither be missed nor be any loss. The Duke is a very worthy man but no statesman, and there are hundreds who can replace him with advantage to the country. The Duke Decezes is spoken of, but we do not think the time is arrived for his taking office. Were he to do so it would be the best guarantee of friendly relations between this country and France. The Duke was Ambassador here—he studied the English character, and learnt to admire it. He mentidated on our institutions, and was not blind to their numberless defects which led him to make the following observation:—"English are better than their institutions, and the French worse than theirs." The Duke is a sound statesman, and if he becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs we may look to a straight-forward, manly system in French policy.

The Duke's father-in-law, M. de St. Aulaire, is also spoken of; he is a man of talent, and has been Ambassador at Rome and Vienna, but he is not calculated for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and we are persuaded he would refuse it, were it offered to him.

M. Zavala, Ambassador from Mexico to the French Government, has arrived at Havre, on board the *Poland*. He is invested with full powers to enter upon a negotiation for establishing a political and commercial connexion between France and Mexico; and is, it is said, charged with instructions to endeavour to induce the Government of Spain to acknowledge the independence of Spanish America. It is also said that M. Montilla is coming to Europe on a similar mission with regard to Spain.—*Galignani's Messenger.*

FRANCE.

From the *Constitutionnel*.—March 30

IMPROBABILITY OF A DISSOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

The *Temps*, referring to the rumours of a coldness between the cabinets of London and Paris, and the increasing intimacy between the latter and that of St. Petersburg, says:—"An Alliance with Russia is unpopular in France, and not without reason. That country is too far off to do us much good or much harm. It is worthy of romance to believe in her power against the British possessions, or in so much devotedness in our favour as to consume her slender treasury, her powerless battalions, her fleet, and her diplomacy, to share with us the empire of the world and to obtain from our good-will the supremacy of the East, which she usurps at pleasure. Neither the interest nor the strength of France are on this side. But to preserve the alliance of England, it is necessary to remain faithful to the principles on which it was founded. The revolution of July is the mother of reform. Both are concerned. The same blow which strikes one attacks the other in its existence. It is because France is no longer governed by the friends of the regeneration of July, that the power of the Whigs vacillates in their hands. The prolongation of the doctrinaire's reign must end in bringing back the Tories to public affairs. The former are well aware of this, but who knows? Perhaps they desire? We do not deceive ourselves as to attachment, more or less disinterested of the British press to abstract principles of liberalism in politics. But liberalism in affairs is its chief point in view, because it sincerely represents public opinion. The Ministry well knows what is to be done to preserve and to cement the British alliance. It knows also what will be lost in losing this alliance. It must be supposed that it is anxious to gain time in deferring the Customs' bill. May the composition of a new Chamber, and we sincerely add of a new Ministry, give a chance of deciding this difficult but inevitable question. It seems to us, at all events that in 1834, at the point to which civilization has advanced a divorce between France and England would be monstrous, an insult to Providence."

The *Journal des Debats* has the following—"For some time past there has existed a concerted plan to destroy the public confidence in the continuance of the alliance between England and France, while, in truth, we have not been able to find the slightest shadow of a pretence for the extravagant observations which have made their way even into the British parliament; it is true, they came through Mr. O'Connell, who is scarcely ever listened to except when speaking upon the affairs of Ireland. With the organs of Toryism the dissolution of the Anglo-French alliance is a favourite topic, but so worn out, that it no longer produces

any effect; it is a constant appeal to the old prejudices on the rivalry of the two nations, a dotage which is not worthy of being refuted; but it is strange and grievous to find journals that pique themselves upon a patriotism even more sensitive than ours, using the utmost endeavours to support the impotent efforts of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Londonderry. We maintain that there is not, there cannot be, any relaxation of that insubstantial bond which unites France of 1830 and reformed England. The foreign policy of the two governments may on secondary questions, be regulated by the more or less immediate interests of the two kingdoms, but there is not a single serious question on which their policy does not assume that identity which is the consequence of our common institutions, and at the present day rules over all the combinations of Europe."

ROBERT BURNS.

(From the *Printing Machine*, or a Review for the *Many*.)

(From the *Times*, March 6.)

We are willing to draw a veil, which perhaps never ought to have been raised, over the tenderer failings of Burns's early manhood, yet we cannot but express our opinion that the transgressions of his after life have never been fairly or clearly put, and properly compared with the general state of society at the time in which the poet lived. These transgressions of Burns were occasional fits of conviviality and inebriety (for he never appeared to have been a regular drunkard), and occasional flights of rant and extravagance in which grossness of thought as well as of expression is but too prominent.

The latter defect, according to Mr. Lockhart "ought to be mainly ascribed to his desire of accommodating himself for the moment to the habits and taste of certain buckish tradesmen of Edinburgh, and other such like persons;" but, in our opinion, it is to be ascribed to no such cause, but to be considered as a natural result of the first defect, or excess in drinking, a habit which was at the time even more common among Scotch lairds and people of good condition, with whom Burns associated much, than among those contemptuously designated as "tradesmen of Edinburgh and other such like persons," of whom, during the latter and the worst part of his life, Burns saw very little. That drunkenness often ended in coarseness, ribaldry, and at times almost in sacrilege, and this too from the mouths of lords, lairds, judges, advocates—nay, even ministers of the kirk, Mr. Lockhart must have known very well; and, as a Scotsman himself, he must have equally well remembered many poetical sallies from these privileged classes, compared to which many of Burns's were decorous *jeux d'esprit*. At the time when Mr. Lockhart attempted to attach the odium of the poet's corrupting to an inferior grade, he must also have remembered certain individuals of a superior order who had brought down to his own day and generation all the vices of the general state of society in the days of poor Burns. He has not hesitated to quote, in his biography, one of the coarsest couplets the poet ever penned, which signifies that he (Burns), among the honours and distinctions he "a lion" for a season, and then dismissed him, counted his having been "drunken" at lawyers' feast, and worse than drunk among "godly priests." Indeed, Mr. Lockhart himself informs us that the poet "partook largely in those tavern scenes of audacious hilarity which then soothed, as matter of course, the arid labours of the northern noblesse de la robe." At a later period of Burns's life young lawyers and young surgeons, excitements and supervisors, do not appear to have had more of his company than the members of the "Caladonian Club," and of the "Dumfries and Galloway Hunt," and the greatest debauch he celebrates (in "The Whistle") was a contest that took place between such men as Sir Robert Laurie; Ferguson of Craigdarroch, "so famous for wit, worth, and law;" and Glenriddel, who, in the words of Allan Cunningham, "was an elder, and a ruling one, in the kirk," the bard being "selected to witness the fray." It is recorded of these orgies, that Glenriddel, after they had drunk 6 bottles of claret a-piece, retired as day was breaking; that Sir Robert did not fall under the table until the sun had risen, and that then Burns, who had drunk bottle for bottle, was much inclined to continue the drinking contest with Craigdarroch, the conqueror of the "distinguished" trio, who when he had finished his sixth bottle despatched a quart of wine at a draught. The simple truth is, that the standard of sobriety, and of propriety of demeanour, and language, was then much lower than among all classes of society. Where hard drinking was an habitual vice, it was just as likely to lead lords and gentlemen to rebaldry, indecency, coarseness of language, and allusion to excesses of another nature, and finally to premature decay, as it was to produce the same results in "an Ayrshire peasant, and tradesmen of Edinburgh, and other such like persons."

The British tradesmen of the present day might as a body look down upon the coarse tastes, the tone of society, the domestic economy, and the general quality of the proud cotemporaries of Robert Burns; for most of them, we would venture to say have more real refinement, have more education among themselves and their children, are better lodged and provided with the comforts of life, than the "patricians of the good year 1786." The class beneath them, as well as that above them, has probably, on the whole, had a proportionate share in the general improvement, and that both may continue to rise and keep their respective places in the forward march, is not less their interest than it is our wish.

We cannot lay down the memoirs of the poet without noticing those bright parts of his life when he laboured, in his confined circle, to produce a taste for letters, and to diffuse knowledge. This was indeed not a passing whim, but a constant aim of the poet's; and, on this head, Cunningham and Lockhart have rendered him justice. When a very young man he established at Tarbolton a club for youths of his own humble condition, in

which discussion and debate on given subjects, were mingled with conviviality. This club only met once a month, and one of its rules did not permit any member to spend more than 3d. at a sitting in drunk. When he was somewhat older, and removed to Mossgiel, he aided in forming a club of a still more intellectual character, for it purchased books, and all fines for non-attendance were spent in that way. The members of this society were country lads, chiefly sons of agricultural labourers, who soon had the honest satisfaction of placing a volume of their comrade Burns's inimitable poems on the shelf of their little library.

EXTRACTS FROM BARROW'S EXCURSIONS.

AUTOCRATICAL AMUSEMENT.

In one part of the gardens of the Palace of Peterhof, there is a tree with a seat round it; and if any ignorant person should be beguiled to rest his weary limbs there, he stands a chance of being detained longer than he might probably wish, or of getting a good *ducking*, as, at some little distance amongst the shrubbery, there is a cock, which, when turned into the water into pipes that communicate very ingeniously with this tree, and that empty themselves from the spreading branches, very much in the fashion of a shower bath, at the circumference of about two feet from the trunk of the tree, confining the simple within a watery cage, much to the amusement, no doubt of his companions who had enticed him thither. This might be a good practical joke for the amusement of children in a suburban tea-garden, but it seemed to us rather out of character in an imperial residence.

DANDY RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Here we saw some soldiers belonging to a regiment of Hussars, evidently what is termed a "crack" regiment. The uniform is scarlet, and made to fit them well; but the finest looking men I have seen are those of a regiment of horse guards quartered at Peterhof, who certainly equal our Life Guards as far as concerns the appearance of the men; and the horses also were, if possible, finer animals than ours. The uniform of this regiment is white, and they wore leather breeches and jack-boots similar to those worn by the Life Guards.

At Cronstadt, I remember seeing a small detachment of the Imperial Guard; and a very smart-looking set of fellows they were, as indeed they well may be, having been selected from the whole of the Russian army. The uniform is very handsome. Observing some of the privates standing outside of the guard-house, we walked up to inspect them more closely, and they appeared to be much pleased at our notice of them. Their clothes were also beautifully made; and had they even been cut on "scientific principles" by Mr. Stultz, they could not have fitted them better, particularly their trousers, which contrary to ours, are made to fit close to the leg, and sit without a wrinkle; but throughout the whole of the Russian army, it is the fashion for the dress to be drawn in at the waist to such a degree as to cause a sensation of pain in looking at them. Our great-grandmothers on the canvas of Knelier hardly exhibit a smaller waist than a Russian soldier; he looks as if he would break in two in the middle.

TABLE D'HOTE AT ST. PETERSBURG.

While living at Petersburg, we mixed as much as we could with the Russian gentry, that is to say, with the military and the employés; we made a point of dining very frequently at the principal table d'hôte in the city, where in general between forty and fifty sat down every day to dinner. Many of these were officers fully accoutred in their regimentals, who added much to the effect of the dinner-table. The price of dinner was six paper rubles (or six francs) a head, but this sum included a bottle of excellent claret. The dinner-hour was half past four to a moment, the master proclaiming the time from a clock at one end of the room, upon the striking of which every one took his seat. On the side-tables were placed different kinds of spirits, with bread, butter, caviare, and cheese. It appeared to be the general custom, for each person observed it, to take a glass of the *liqueur* and a mouthful of bread and cheese before they sat down to their meal; and as example is catching, we thought it right to do the same. At table, each dish was served up separately beginning with soup, a plateful of which was brought to each person by one of the waiters; but all the other dishes were handed round by them, and everybody helped himself to that which he fancied most. The Russians, like the French and Germans, partook of every dish. A large supply of ice was placed on the table, and the general mode of using it was to put a lump of it into a tumbler of wine.

When the dinner was ended, a glass of spirits was again served out to every one, as well as a cup of coffee, and a cigar, all of which were included in the six rubles.

Now commenced the smoking. Most of the assembly had long pipes, which were placed under the table between their legs; but some few were contented with their cigar. In less than five minutes, the room, as may be supposed, became one dense mass of smoke, and the fumes of the tobacco to one who, like myself, is not in the habit of smoking, were quite suffocating, and I always made my escape into the open air as soon as with decency I could. One particularly smoker, with large mustachios, amused me exceedingly by a habit he had acquired of puffing a large volume of smoke through his nostrils, which occurred at such regular intervals, that at last I discovered that it came at every sixth puff. My utter inexperience in the art renders me incapable of conceiving what pleasurable sensation could be derived from this strange trick.

TRONJEM.

Besides the cathedral, there are three other churches, all of them plain structures. The other public buildings are—an hospital for the aged or infirm; a workhouse, or house of industry; a public library and museum; and a public grammar school; there are besides, other schools on the Lancasterian plan; nor can it be said that literature is neglected, particularly that which relates to the history and antiquities of Norway. Most of the lower class can read and write, and a Bible and psalter may be found in every house. But we were not prepared to meet in this northern city, in the latitude of 63° N. so many of the more respectable part of the inhabitants well acquainted with, and conversant in, the English language; and still less could we have expected to find how well-informed they were in regard to passing events in England, in which they appeared to take a more than common interest; they knew perfectly well who had spoken on such and such a question in the House of Commons, and which side he took in the debate. Both here and in Bergen, every thing that relates to England seemed to create a deep interest. We are told by certain travel-writers, that

"In glancing over Dr. Clarke's Preface to his 'Scandinavia,' &c. I find the following passage: 'This word (Tronjem), if accurately pronounced in our language, would, with us be Tronjem, which is the real name of the place. It was the wish of many of its literary inhabitants, that this should be duly stated to the English nation, with a view, if it be possible, to abolish the nicknames of Dronthim and Dronten, bestowed upon this city by the Irish, who, from their intercourse with Norway, first gave rise to these appellations. It is not a more low and vulgar barbarism to drive Luman instead of London, than it is to substitute Dra itheim or Dronten in lieu of Tronjem.'"

Englishmen are hated in foreign countries. I am proud to say I never experienced it, and I am inclined to think the discovery must have been made by some of those who have brought on themselves, by their conduct, that feeling.

MANNERS AND CHARACTER OF THE NORWEGIANS, WITH

TORY REFLECTIONS.

We were more and more delighted as we proceeded, with the honest and simple minded peasantry of Norway, and deeply regretted our inability to converse with them, except through an interpreter. Poorly as they appear to live, they are in no way depressed, but are active sprightly, and have every appearance of being blessed with sound and healthy constitutions, gifted with much intelligence, and frequently disposed to be witty. We understood that, although they struggled hard for their independence, and at last submitted to the yoke of Sweden, on compulsion, they are much more happy than they were under the dominion of Denmark; less annoyed with petty demands upon them for certain services; less taxed, which always seems a great boon; the conscription is abolished; and the laws are more favourable to the liberty of the subject. Two points they were most anxious to obtain—the application of the surplus revenue to the wants and improvements of Norway, and the abolition of the aristocracy. The first, I believe, is yet in discussion; the latter they have eventually obtained, much against the wish of Sweden, where nobles are "as plenty as blackberries." The Norwegians hold in great veneration the memory of their ancient kings, and what they now wish for is a monarchical democracy—a king and the people, without the intervention of a third estate. The peasantry are said to be somewhat superstitious, as, indeed, all mountaineers are, more or less. They are not much given to roam; they are attached to their mountains, their rivers, and their fiords, which are made the burden of their songs. They have several national airs or hymns in celebration of their heroes, their beauties, and their mountains, set to simple and melodious airs.

The few of what may be called the upper class with whom we had any intercourse in the towns were of kind and affable manners, and clever, well-informed men; they were generally perfect masters of our language, and entered willingly into conversation. But we saw only a few of them. In Bergen and in Tronjem all the gentry were absent at their little villas; and some of them this year at the Storting. To become thoroughly acquainted with the state of society would require a winter's residence; to see the country in all its beauty and grandeur, the only favourable time is in the summer months.

We invariably found the lower class simple and open-hearted, inclined to be very friendly, and always cheerful. Even those whom we saw in parts where their livelihood was earned most hardily, and who in winter must be reduced to almost absolute starvation, were nevertheless happy and contented. Black bread of barley or rye, with milk and butter, and sometimes a little dried or salted fish, constitute their daily fare. Butchers meat is out of the question; thousands know not what it is, and the majority very rarely taste it. In the whole of our tour, excepting at Christiania, Bergen, and Tronjem, we never met with a single morsel of it. The happy and contented disposition of these single minded people, under all their privations, might afford an instructive lesson to those who have been pampered in cities, and surrounded by all the luxuries they could desire, and yet are discontented and far from enjoying that degree of happiness which falls to the lot of these poor Norwegian mountaineers.

Farewell, then to Norway!—a long farewell to her snow-capped mountains, her fire clad hills, her lovely valleys, her clear and limpid streams, her clearer lakes and unfathomable fiords! Farewell, ye free and happy and contented sons of the mountains! May no intruder disturb your peaceful cottages with wild and pernicious theories, that lead only to confusion and ruin! Listen rather to those sound precepts delivered from the mouths of your venerable pastors, your best instructors and truest friends!—*Spectator*, April 5.

MISTAKEN JUDGMENTS OF THE CONDUCT OF YOUTH.—How dangerous how foolish, how presumptuous, is it in adults to suppose that they can read the thoughts and the feelings of those of a tender age! How often has this presumption, on their part, been the ruin of a young mind, which, if truly estimated and duly fostered, would have blossomed and produced good fruit? The blush of honest indignation is as dark as the blush of guilt—and the paleness of concentrated courage as marked as that of fear—the firmness of conscious innocence is but too often mistaken as the effrontery of hardened vice—and the tears springing from a source of injury, the tongue tied from the oppression of a wounded heart, the trembling and agitation of the little frame convulsed with emotion, have often and often been ascribed by prejudging and self-opinionated witnesses, to the very opposite passions to those which have produced them. Youth should never be judged harshly, and even when judged correctly, should it be in an evil course, may always be reclaimed;—those who decide otherwise, and leave it to drift about the world, have to answer for the cast-away.—(*Jacob Faithful*,) *Metropolitan* for March.

ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH.—*Great Lens in one Piece*.—At a meeting of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, three splendid polyzonal lenses were exhibited by permission of the Commissioners of the Northern Light-houses. One of these was made at Paris; another in London, and the third was received from Newcastle. The diameter of the outer zone of two of these lenses is two feet six inches, and that of the London instrument is three feet. Their local distance is about three feet. A single Argand burner was placed in the focus of one of the lenses, but the effect was feeble, as this instrument requires a powerful light. By exposing it to the rays of the sun it suddenly melts pieces of copper and other metals placed in its focus. The Newcastle lens is made of one piece of highly polished glass. Buffon, nearly a century ago, first suggested the idea of a polyzonal burning-glass; but the construction of this instrument has till now been considered beyond the skill of the artist, and the method of building them in separate pieces was afterwards suggested and practised both in this country and in France. Messrs. Cookson, however, the plate-glass makers of Newcastle, have at length triumphed over the difficulties which so long retarded the execution of Buffon's project. Mr. Stevenson, on the part of the Light-house Board, only stipulated that the lenses which they were employed to make should be built in the manner practised in France.

BOMBAY.—Printed and published for the PROPRIETORS by SORABJEE DORABJEE, at the Courier Press, No. 9 Church Lane, were all communications addressed to the EDITOR, are received.